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All too often, one greets the newest edition of a law school text with
something less than enthusiasm. Typically, the "new" edition is the "old"
book, with a few new cases and articles and footnotes jammed into the old
form, which maintains the structure, analytic framework, and perspective
of the original edition. Derrick Bell could easily have gotten away with
the typical ploy. He had already produced an exciting and unconventional
book,1 rich in material on the historical and social context of legal devel-
opments, refreshingly insistent in its unabashed quest for racial justice.
Instead of merely replicating a previous success, however, Bell has written
a new book,' drawing on the strengths of the earlier edition while offering
a new form, a new perspective, and a basis for a serious critical appraisal
of civil rights law.
If one goes no further than the summary table of contents,' the book
looks rather conventional, what one would expect from a civil rights text.
There is a fifty-page historical chapter, followed by eight substantive
chapters, dealing with interracial sex and marriage, public facilities, vot-
ing rights, administration of justice, protests and demonstrations,, educa-
tion, housing, and employment. A mere glance at the detailed table of
contents, however, suggests that there is something different about this
t Visiting Professor of Law, SUNY/Buffalo School of Law. Some of the ideas in this book review
were originally expressed at a panel program at the Third National Conference on Critical Legal
Studies, held at New College of California School of Law, San Francisco, California, November 1979.
1. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1st ed. 1973).





book. One sees topic headings such as "The Principle of the Involuntary
Sacrifice," 4 "Reserved Racial Representation,"' "Racial Interest-Conver-
gence Principles,"6 "Minority Admissions as a White Strategy,"' and
"Employment and the Race-Class Conflict."8 In these sections as well as
in ones with more conventional names, Bell introduces, develops, and am-
plifies a number of themes that run through the book.
A major theme is that there is one and only one criterion for assessing
the success or failure of civil rights law-results. Bell's approach to legal
doctrine is unabashedly instrumental. The only important question is
whether doctrinal developments have improved, worsened, or left un-
changed the actual lives of American blacks (the book focuses almost ex-
clusively on black/white relationships because it is in that context that
most of the doctrine has developed). Bell eschews the realm of abstract,
ahistorical, normative debate; he focuses instead on the relationships be-
tween doctrine and concrete change, and the extent to which doctrine can
be manipulated to produce more change. With respect to voting rights, for
example, Bell offers three prerequisites to effective voting-access to the
ballot, availability of political power, motivation to participate in the po-
litical processg-and then argues for recognition of aggregate voting rights
and affirmative action in filling electoral positions.10 Similarly, with re-
spect to education, the issue for Bell is not desegregation, if that implies
integration as the remedial goal, but how to obtain effective education for
black children, with or without busing or racial balance.' In its instru-
mentalism and result orientation, the new book resembles the first edition,
although many arguments have been developed further. The critical per-
spective of the new book, however, sets a strikingly different tone from
that of the old one.
The problem addressed by Bell confronts everyone currently teaching
civil rights law who is committed to achieving measurable, objective, sub-
stantive results: these results have for the most part not been achieved, and
legal doctrine has evolved to rationalize the irrelevance of results. In 1973,
when Bell's first edition came out, one could, despite the Burger Court,
look with optimism at civil rights litigation. Perhaps the Court was going
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but it was remaining firm on civil rights. Decisions like Swann,t"
Wright,1 and Griggs" not only allayed fears, but actually contributed to a
spirit of utopianism. Since then, and beginning in 1974, we have exper-
ienced, among other Supreme Court cases, Milliken v. Bradley,"5
Pasadena Board of Education v. Slangler,"6 Beer v. United States,7 City
of Mobile v. Bolden,"8 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,19 Washington v. Davis,20 Warth v. Seldin,21 and Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
22
It is tempting to regard these decisions as aberrations, as cases that
could just as easily have "gone the other way," with better legal argument
or incremental changes in judicial personnel (a fantasy becoming even
more remote in the current political environment). Bell could, consistently
with his result orientation, have simply offered new legal arguments or
ways of distinguishing the worst cases, and seized on the few deviant deci-
sions, however ambiguous their reasoning, as substantial sources of hope.21
Even this strategy would have required dismantling much of the first edi-
tion, such as the long section on seniority remedies under Title VII, swept
away by the Teamsters case, or the lower court cases, given prominence in
the first edition, that have since been obliterated by footnote twelve in
Washington v. Davis. 4 The alternative approach is to try to put the doc-
trinal developments in perspective by asking what could have been ex-
pected from modern civil rights law, in whose interest the enterprise really
functioned anyway, and whether what has actually happened is in fact
more consistent with fundamental patterns of American society than what
was once expected.
From the very beginning of the book, Bell develops such an alternative
12. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
13. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
14. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
15. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
16. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
17. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
18. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
19. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
20. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
21. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
22. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
23. For example, Bell makes little of the 1979 decisions in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449 (1979), and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), treating them briefly,
and moving on quickly to a discussion implying the worthlessness and futility of seeking racial balance
remedies within urban school districts. See pp. 406-31.
24. The first edition contained a twenty-page section on seniority, rendered largely moot by the
Teamsters case. Compare D. BELL, supra note 1, at 762-82 with International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). With respect to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), of
the seven cases not involving public employment that were "overruled" in footnote twelve, 426 U.S. at
244 & n.12, the six that had then been decided were featured cases in Bell's first edition. See D.
BELL, supra note 1, at 485, 652, 686, 700, 761.
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perspective. In the preface he suggests:
We have witnessed hard-won decisions, intended to protect basic
rights of black citizens from racial discrimination, lose their vitality
before they could be enforced effectively. In a nation dedicated to
individual freedom, laws that never should have been needed face
neglect, reversal, and outright repeal, while the discrimination they
were designed to eliminate continues in the same or a more sophisti-
cated form.25
The historical chapter not only provides background information, but also
argues that what we have just gone through is best understood as a "Sec-
ond Reconstruction," perhaps less successful than the first.26 Bell's discus-
sion of the Emancipation Proclamation leads him to offer some general-
izations intended to echo throughout the book:
First, blacks are more likely to obtain relief for even acknowledged
racial injustice when that relief also serves, directly or indirectly, to
further ends which policymakers perceive are in the best interests of
the country. Second, blacks as well as their white allies, are likely to
focus with gratitude on the relief obtained, usually after a long
struggle. Little attention is paid to the self-interest factors without
which no relief might have been gained. Moreover, the relief is
viewed as proof that society is indeed just, and that eventually all
racial injustices will be recognized and remedied. Third, the remedy
for blacks appropriately viewed as a "good deal" by policymaking
whites often provides benefits for blacks that are more symbolic than
substantive; but whether substantive or not, they are often perceived
by working class whites as both an unearned gift to blacks and a
betrayal of poor whites.27
Moreover, Bell takes serious issue with the liberal myth of "the civil
rights crusade as a long, slow, but always upward pull that must, given
the basic precepts of the country and the commitment of its people to
equality and liberty, eventually end in the full enjoyment by blacks of all
rights and privileges of citizenship enjoyed by whites.""
In support of this alternative perspective, Bell marshals a diverse array
of sources. In the historical chapter, he cites historian Edmund Morgan
for the view that "slavery for blacks led to greater freedom for poor
whites," 9 and develops that view a few pages later into a principle of
25. P. xxiii.
26. See pp. 37-38.
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"involuntary sacrifice" of blacks? He uses a quotation from Justice
Holmes about the powerlessness of law to define a notion of "democratic
domination."'" In a wonderfully inside-out (and somewhat ironic) treat-
ment of Herbert Wechsler's famous "neutral principles" argument, Bell
suggests that Wechsler may have been normatively wrong but descrip-
tively all-too accurate:
To the extent that this conflict is between 'racial equality' and 'asso-
ciational freedom,' used here as a proxy for all those things whites
will have to give up in order to achieve a racial equality that is more
than formal, it is clear that the conflict will never be mediated by a
"neutral principle." If it is to be resolved at all, it will be determined
by the existing power relationships in the society and the perceived
self-interest of the white elite. 2
Bell is not at all hesitant in citing and taking advantage of the work of
more radical critics. W.E.B. Dubois is cited for his perception that the
Brown decision would not have been possible "'without the world pres-
sure of communism'" and the self-perceived role of the United States as
leader of the "Free World."33 Lewis Steel is quoted for his perception that
doctrinal changes in the law governing sit-ins and demonstrations were
attributable to the fact that blacks ceased to be " 'humble supplicants
seeking succor from White America'" and became more militant, with the
resultant decisions amounting to a "'judicial concession to white anxie-
ties.' "'4 From Frances Piven and Richard Cloward comes the perception
that "the poor gain more through mass defiance and disruptive protests
than by organizing for electoral politics and other more acceptable reform
policies," and that the latter kind of activity actually undermines effective-
ness.3 And I discovered myself cited for the proposition that "the probable
long-term result of the civil rights drive based on integration remedies will
result in the bourgeoisification of some blacks who will be, more or less,
accepted into white society," with the great mass of blacks remaining in a
disadvantaged status,36 and quoted at some length for my own perceptions
about the ideology of antidiscrimination law.37
With the presence of his more intense critical perspective, Bell's "Ra-
cism Hypos," which appeared in the first edition and regularly punctuate
30. Pp. 29-30.
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his substantive chapters in the new edition, gain more force and become
more valuable teaching devices. As in the earlier book, Bell uses these
problems to ask the hard questions, probing the tension between concrete
results and abstract rights, between group needs and individualistic as-
sumptions, between legal doctrine and concrete historical reality, between
the presupposed "color-blind" world of ethnic fungibility and the actual
asymmetry of racism. One must confront such problems as black opposi-
tion to remedial law assisting interracial couples, 8 prison segregation
through (seemingly) genuine freedom of choice,39 and mandatory propor-
tionate representation based on race in county government" or in the jury
box.4"
While retaining valuable features of the first edition, Bell has substan-
tially altered the form of the book. The book is neither a casebook (as was
the first edition, although of the "cases and materials" variety) nor a trea-
tise on civil rights doctrine. It is a text about the development of civil
rights law. There are no cases as such. Instead, Bell offers narrative ac-
counts of cases, almost always capturing with precision both facts and rea-
soning.42 As an educational technique, his method is much more useful
than a large collection of heavily edited cases, enhancing student assimila-
tion of doctrinal materials while promoting the continuing interplay be-
tween cases and other materials. A subtler effect, too, stems from the
change in form. The cases cease to be atomic units investigated individu-
ally for their reasoning, their flaws, and their impact; instead, they pre-
sent themselves as parts of an evolving historical pattern. One grasps
much more easily through this form how the cases were related to one
another as they developed. Yet the change in form, along with Bell's criti-
cal perspective, raises two serious issues, both much more easily presented
than resolved. What is one supposed to do in teaching this course? Does
(or should) the book offer a social theory of contemporary racism or, in
particular, of the relationship between race and class?
In the last chapter of the book, Bell offers three generalizations about
employment discrimination law that, he suggests, are equally applicable to
other areas of antidiscrimination law:
4 3
1. Employment discrimination laws will not eliminate employment
38. Pp. 69-70. Bell retained five of the seventeen Racism Hypos from the first edition, adding




42. A paperback companion volume is available for those who want cases, containing edited ver-
sions of 37 Supreme Court cases. CIVIL RIGHTS: LEADING CASES (D. Bell ed. 1980).
43. P. 657.
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discrimination.
2. Employment discrimination laws will not help millions of non-
whites.
3. Employment discrimination laws could divide those blacks who
can from those who cannot benefit from its protection.
Generalizations like these, in the context of this book, trigger a realization
in the reader that a significant line has been crossed between the two
editions of Race, Racism and American Law. That line represents the
difference between teaching students to do civil rights law and teaching
them about the unhappy history of modern civil rights law. It is not that
the doctrinal materials are missing. To the extent that arguments remain
available, one can find them in the book, or find the materials from which
to formulate one's own. In many instances, doctrinal developments have
already played themselves out to depressing conclusions. In at least one
instance in which Bell ends a chapter in the second edition on a tentative
and limited note of optimism, a subsequent Supreme Court case has
reached the depressing conclusion.4"
Despite the presence of doctrinal materialg, the book in its dominant
tone is impatient with legal doctrine and despairing; the book reflexively
yet almost unwillingly offers legal arguments unlikely ever to be accepted.
For some, Bell's emphasis will be regarded as merely cynical; others will
find it realistic. At this point, my first serious issue reappears. What is one
supposed to do in teaching this course? The simplest, but perhaps too
facile, answer is: tell the truth. Yet if the truth seems so hopeless and
dismal, and the generation of more legal argument so pointless, then one
is dealing with something other than the usual law school enterprise of
helping students to fashion a measure of craft, skill, and insight to deal
with the needs and hopes of social life.
The dissonance becomes more striking when one considers the students
who typically take a course in civil rights law. Based on my own eight
years of teaching the course, I can report that the students who elect it
tend to be the most committed to the goal of seeking social justice through
law, the most believing in the possibility of such an outcome. Thus, one
finds oneself not only offering a cynical perspective on one of the most
idealistic areas of legal endeavor, but sharing that perspective with the
students most likely to carry on with the endeavor in the future. One must
let those students know that civil rights doctrine depends on and gains its
44. Bell devotes a section to "voter dilution" cases in the Fifth Circuit, finding some basis for the
most cautious of optimism for some voters in that circuit. See pp. 181-86. The principal case relied on
was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1980. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), revr
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (1978).
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legitimacy through a number of presuppositions." The world depicted in
the doctrine is one of autonomous and responsive law, shared values (for
example, individualism, color-blindness), monolithic whiteness or black-
ness (that is, no class structure), and gradual yet linear progress. To ques-
tion these presuppositions is to suggest the gap between the mythical
world of legal doctrine and the real world in history-where law is rela-
tively autonomous at best and responsive to power more than to
powerlessness, where values are contradictory, conflicting, and bound up
with patterns of domination and hierarchy, where class relationships exist
along side racial ones, and where cyclical failure is as plausible as linear
progress. Then what?
A number of teaching strategies are possible. One is simply to promote
the self-conscious manipulation of legal doctrine to achieve whatever re-
sults one can. This approach emphasizes "playing the law game" but ref-
uses to accord the game any legitimacy other than in utilizing the forms of
argument the players must adopt. Along with this approach comes the
frank recognition that structural change will not come through litigation
(or legislation, given the current political process) and that all one can do
is win occasional cases and improve the lives of some people.
A second strategy would extend the first and call for maximal
politicization of the doctrinal activity-pushing the legal forms for explic-
itly political reasons to reveal contradictions and limits, promote public
awareness, and even win cases. A variant of the second strategy would
take off from the Piven and Cloward insight about mass movements"" and
seek to promote legal activity that maximizes the force and protects the
integrity of large, noisy, disruptive political activity, which is the real
method of extracting concessions from power.
In some fashion, however, each of these strategies preserves the myths
of liberal reform. To avoid those myths, one must simultaneously consider
civil rights doctrine as immersed in social and historical reality. Such an
approach assumes that negative, critical activity that self-consciously his-
toricizes areas of legal doctrine like civil rights law will lead both to more
self-aware and effective employment of legal forms and to a more realistic
appraisal of the comparative utility of mechanisms for social change. The
issue is not one for legal teaching alone; its implications are precisely par-
allel for both practice and scholarship. Yet it is one thing to call for-and
show the need for-the historicization of civil rights law, and quite an-
other to write the history. The task of unmasking, of exposing presupposi-
45. For my own more detailed discussion of these, see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimina-
tion Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 1049, 1052-57, 1065-76 (1978).
46. See p. 1884 supra.
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tions, of delegitimizing, is easier than that of offering a concrete historical
account to replace what is exposed as inadequate. The remainder of this
review will consider the more difficult, reconstructive problem.
The starting point is a return to Bell's text. Despite the already de-
scribed overall tone of the book, Bell stops short of offering a coherent
account that would place civil rights law in its historical and social setting.
The crucial passages in the book are those in which Bell, through his own
comments or those of others, permits the question of race to intersect with
that of class.47 I discovered no fewer than twenty-seven references, direct
or indirect, spread throughout the book.48 For example, Bell asks whether
"the capitalistic class structure [could] maintain itself without the scape-
goat role which blacks have filled for 300 years. ' 49 He suggests that segre-
gation laws "represented an economic-political compromise between elite
and working-class whites."' 0 He characterizes the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of metropolitan school desegregation remedies as having "allayed
middle-class fears."5 Substantive racial equality, for Bell, has nothing to
do with "neutral principles"; rather, "it will be determined by the existing
power relationships in the society and the perceived self-interest of the
white elite."52 Even the Brown case is regarded as having happened, not
primarily out of any national sense of injustice, but more out of a sense of
political or economic self-interest on the part of elite whites.5 3 Poor whites
fail to see the similarity of their position with blacks "under an economic
system that exploits and subjugates both groups,"'1 but they do per-
ceive-correctly-that advances for blacks will come at their expense.55
Yet, as Bell says in criticizing referenda, "lower-class whites will often
support referenda advancing middle-class values, even to the detriment of
their own economic interests," isolating blacks from "potential class al-
lies."5 6 With respect to housing, Bell finds it "hardly accidental that the
most active proponents of fair housing are those liberals living in areas
47. I do not mean to adopt any particular, narrow, or simplistic notion of "class." While in-
tending to remain within the Marxist tradition, I prefer to use "class" as still the best shorthand
referent for the complex of recurring relationships of power and hierarchy that pervade American
society, as well as for the institutional and ideological forms supporting those relationships.
It is interesting to note that the race-class issue has become a matter of debate in the establishment
media, although reprocessed as "The Black Plight: Race or Class?" See N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1980, § 9
(Magazine), at 22.
48. See pp. 7, 51, 64, 66, 85-86, 93, 267, 399, 435, 437, 438, 439, 443, 454-56, 457, 492, 530,







55. See p. 457.
56. P. 492.
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where housing is priced beyond the means of all but a small number of
elite blacks."57 He notes the "irony of middle-class blacks joining with
middle-class whites to oppose any housing project intended to benefit poor
blacks." 8 Finally, in the last chapter of the book, Bell focuses directly on
"Employment and the Race-Class Conflict," suggesting that successful ef-
forts to achieve racial equality will remain limited "until poorer whites
come to recognize that their disadvantaged position in the society will not
be improved so long as they choose to blame blacks rather than ruling
class whites for their plight."5 9
One comes away from these excerpts with a sense of confusion engen-
dered by many of the questions that have often plagued radical or Marxist
thought about racism. Is racism a unique form of oppression, with its own
history and ideology, or one that merely follows from class relationships in
capitalist society? Does racial discrimination remain economically neces-
sary, or even useful, to ruling-class whites? Or is it just a problem of
neutralizing an ideological hangover from the past? Can racism be
targeted as a form of oppression to be remedied while holding class rela-
tionships otherwise intact? Is the perpetuation of racial hostility between
lower class whites and blacks something to be desired by ruling classes, or
something to be feared?
For some complicated answers to these questions, at least with respect
to the past, one can turn to the recent and widely hailed work of George
Fredrickson. In White Supremacy,"0 he offers a comparative history of
race relations in the United States and South Africa from the seventeenth
to the twentieth century. Fredrickson's insights resonate with many of
Bell's comments. He suggests that
one cannot understand crucial developments in the history of white
supremacy in the United States and South Africa without assigning
a major causal role to tensions or divisions within the white social
structure. The degradation of non-whites frequently served to bind
together the white population, or some segment of it, to create a
sense of community of solidarity that could become a way of life and
not simply a cover for economic exploitation. 1
With respect to the American South, Fredrickson claims that "the fact
that a majority of the white caste held no slaves was probably a critical
57. P. 536 n.17.
58. P. 565.
59. P. 665.
60. G. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY (1981). For an example of critical reaction, see the
accolade review by David Brion Davis on page one of the New York Times Book Review. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1981, § 10 (Book Review), at 1.
61. G. FREDERICKSON, supra note 61, at 70.
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factor in making racial distinctions as uniquely rigid as they were" be-
cause "racial privilege could and did serve as a compensation for class
disadvantage. '62 Similarly, according to Fredrickson, the failure of the
First Reconstruction may well have been a product of the conflict between
the middle-class idealism of the Radical Republicans and the prospect of
class conflict brought out by an emergent labor movement, the latter re-
vealing the ideological limitations of their egalitarianism." Finally, in
generalizing about the relationship between industrialism and racial dis-
crimination, Fredrickson offers a perspective that may well be applicable
to modem civil rights law:
My assumption is that economic discrimination along racial lines
would not have developed and persisted in the industrial era to the
extent that it did if it had not served in some way the material inter-
ests of industrial capitalists and skilled white workers. But is is diffi-
cult to account for the specific nature of racial caste or exclusion in
industry without reference to pre-existing beliefs about the character,
capacity, and social status of nonwhites. Furthermore, political and
legal developments of a partially autonomous nature could impinge
on the economic order in such a way as to influence significantly, for
better or worse, the life chances of blacks or other nonwhites in the
industrial arena.
64
Fredrickson has little to say about the modern American reform era.
He notes that "Southern blacks were, of course, re-enfranchised and pro-
tected against legalized segregation in the wake of the changed climate of
American opinion and rising black assertiveness that developed after the
Second World War," but he also points out that the "persistence of de
facto segregation in the United States, particularly in the allocation of
urban space and in education, makes it clear that equality and fraternity
do not result automatically from the elimination of Jim Crow laws and
practices."'" I wish that Fredrickson had applied his historical sophistica-
tion to the modern development of civil rights law instead of merely stop-
ping short with this final speculation. His book represents the best of neo-
Marxist scholarship about race and class, blending insights about econom-
ics and ideology, black and white interclass conflict, and the special role of
political and legal institutions. The task for scholars on the left is to apply
similar insights to the civil rights developments of the past twenty-five
years, to begin to offer an account of race and class that avoids the sim-
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id. at 189.
64. Id. at 205.
65. Id. at 280.
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plistic explanations that have all too often been provided.
In marked contrast with Fredrickson, conventional Marxist accounts of
or ways of dealing with racism engender a sense of dissatisfaction or, at
least, incompleteness. No one can deny that racism is a distinct and histor-
ically separate form of oppression. The statement is almost superfluous,
given the actual life experience of people who have been or who are being
so oppressed. But that fact does not by itself suggest that it is a problem
that can be understood by itself as a separate problem. However separate
its origins and historical practices may be, racism must be confronted to-
day within the context of contemporary American capitalist society. The
problem is how to connect a unique history with a complex present.
Traditional Marxist accounts of racism seem often to make the mistake of
either collapsing racism into a problem of class domination generally, as if
it were nothing more than an incidental consequence of evolving capital-
ism (thereby denying its experiential reality), or treating racism as a mode
of oppression so autonomous from capitalist social and economic relation-
ships that it can be rectified by aiming at a target of oppressors that ap-
pears as (classless?) "white society."
One traditional view" sees racism as providing an underclass of wage
laborers willing to work for wages far below those of workers not victim-
ized by racism-the "reserve army of labor." Under this view, racism
serves to hold down wages generally by offering the capitalists a ready
market of cheap unskilled labor. The net results are additional extraction
of surplus value and greater capital accumulation. This is one of the views
that seem to deny the historical reality of racism by almost collapsing it
into an economically motivated capitalist plot. 7 In a less simplistic ver-
sion, however, it cannot be denied that there is some truth in this explan-
tion. What encouraged capital accumulation for a time-and the "reserve
army" may well have done so-need not have been invented by the capi-
talists or by the logic of capitalism. The problem, though, is the present,
and it is questionable whether the "reserve army" theory serves capitalism
at all any more, or is even consistent with the needs of the modern corpo-
rate liberal state. That racism persists-perhaps as a virulent ideological
plague from the past-does not alone make it economically functional.
The question of function is a difficult one to resolve; one is quickly
mired in debates about statistics, job categories, and correlations that may
or may not amount to evidence of causation. It does seem questionable
66. For general discussions, see R. EDWARDS, M. REICH, & T. WEISSKOPF, THE CAPITALIST
SYSTEM 287-321 (1972), and PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN URBAN PERSPECTIVE 143-205
(D. Gordon ed. 1977).
67. For a sensitive critique of theories that merely collapse race into class, see E. GENOVESE, Class
and Nationality in Black America, in IN RED AND BLACK 55-72 (1971).
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whether racism of a kind traditionally experienced by black Americans
remains necessary, or even useful, for the support of capitalist exploita-
tion. Account must be taken of the growth of technology, with its conse-
quent and continuing displacement of unskilled workers, the growth of
welfare systems that make membership in the "reserve army" less func-
tional than it might be otherwise (for capital accumulation, that is), 8 the
continued high levels of unemployment, which provide a "reserve army"
to some extent (one that is disproportionately populated, it is true, by
black and other minority people, but that fact alone does not explain why
racism is functional for capitalism), and the presence of a genuine reserve
army, in the classic sense, in the form of "illegal" aliens. (That many
illegal aliens are members of the same minority groups that have suffered
under traditional American racism may make it ideologically easier for
their exploitation to be tolerated, but that fact does not transform the issue
into one of racism per se.)
The other traditional view, which is just the economic explanation
presented with an explicitly ideological cast, is that racism serves to divide
the working class, to create internal conflicts and antagonisms that frus-
trate the creation of the genuine class consciousness essential to a racial
change.69 Although that view may once have had some truth in it, as it
perhaps still has, it too seems incomplete. For one thing, as noted earlier
with respect to the "reserve army" theory, it does not explain the histori-
cal development of racism as a unique form of oppression; it merely as-
serts the utility of racism for the perpetuation of capitalist class structure.
In addition, because other powerful ideologies also help arrest the devel-
opment of class consciousness-such widespread belief systems as the
"Liberal" tradition, media-induced consumerism, and equality of opportu-
nity, as well as occasional bouts of hysterical nationalism-racism seems
hardly necessary, and perhaps superfluous, if regarded only as serving
that function.
In two other respects, the divide-the-working-class explanation of ra-
cism seems even more seriously deficient. First, it fails to explain how the
abolition of racism, at least at the formal level and in the realm of public
moral consciousness, has become a project of America's dominant classes,
at least in the period since the original Brown decision. This pattern of
change, however limited to the formal and however inadequate in sub-
stance, does suggest the presence of contradictory forces with respect to the
perpetuation of racist practices in the United States. The second problem
68. For a general discussion of the tension between accumulation and legitimation, see J.
O'CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973).
69. For a discussion that relies on a number of explanatory factors, including this one, see P.
BARAN & P. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY CAPITAL 249-80 (1966).
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with this variant of the traditional theory is that it fails to acknowledge
that too much racism may be just as destabilizing to the class structure as
too little. With what we know of twentieth-century world history, it is
entirely plausible that a critical level of racial division-one version may
have been manifested in the George Wallace movement of the late
1960s-may well exploit latent but powerful hostilities to bourgeois soci-
ety among the white working class and create an hysteria that lets loose
the uncontrollable and disordering forces of demagogic fascism.
The other traditional Marxist ways of looking at racism belong more to
political strategy than to theory, but a theory is at least implicit in the
practice. One is the opportunistic approach of selecting members of racial
minorities as people already aware enough of their own oppression within
capitalist society to be receptive to radical political ideas. The theory is
that one has to start somewhere if one is committed to radical political
change (unless one believes in the paramount role of impersonal, inelucta-
ble historical forces) and that people already aware of their oppressed sta-
tus are most likely to form the core of an emerging radical political move-
ment. That theory may even be progressive for those to whom it is
addressed; it may create awareness of and effect some change in racist
practices in an era otherwise dominated by complacent racism. But the
theory is ultimately counterproductive-to the extent that it plays on the
historical uniqueness of racism for its appeal, but denies that uniqueness
in the goals it sets for action, and to the extent that, by simultaneously
identifying racism as a unique experience and disavowing racism's histori-
cal uniqueness, it ends up creating more intraclass racial antagonisms
than the strategy sought to alleviate."
The final Marxist approach is a version of the immediately preceding
one, applied directly to legal struggles. In this view, the legal actions and
political actions that together have achieved what progress there has been
in civil rights have also produced substantive gains in the class struggle.
Although I do not deny the actual achievements of the legal struggle for
civil rights, I do suggest that this view overrates what has been accom-
plished: it ignores the historical uniqueness of racism by substituting for
limited gains in the struggle against racism even more limited gains
against capitalist class structure generally; and by remaining embedded in
one of the traditional Marxist theories of racism, it ignores the possibility
that some measure of racial change may well be in the self-interest of the
contemporary dominant classes. In a long article on civil rights law, which
traced doctrinal developments in the Supreme Court, I argued that civil
70. For some critical views, see H. CRUSE, Behind the Black Power Slogan, in REBELLION OR
REVOLUTION? 193-258 (1968).
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rights law for the twenty-five years since the Brown case has served moie
to rationalize the continued effects of racial discrimination than to pro-
mote any genuine liberation from a history of oppression. 1 Those devel-
opments led me to conclude that the process by which the law absorbed
the civil rights struggle, reprocessed it, and turned it out in recent cases is
in some fashion a part of what may be called the legitimation process.
Today's legal ideology pretends in many ways that racism has been cured,
that the problem has been dealt with, that we can go on to other
problems, that the legal rights that have been created amount to sufficient
equality or liberation for formerly oppressed people. To call those ideas
ideology is to contend that their content masks rather than accords with
reality as we experience it.
An adequate contemporary theory of racism must explain both the pro-
gressive efforts that have been accepted and the tenacity with which the
conditions associated with racism remain in place. I suggest in that regard
that, contrary to some of the traditional Marxist views of racism, at least
since the 1950s it has been in the interest of America's ruling classes to
pretend to be ending racism in this country. The major goals associated
with that project have been to hold the United States out as a genuinely
equal society that does not condone the practices associated with racism in
the past, to avoid embarrassment in the world, and to stabilize the position
of the United States in the world. These goals can be regarded either as
traditionally economic or as part of the role of a state relatively autono-
mous from the capitalist class in its dealings with both its own oppressed
classes and other states in the world arena.72 It seems to me that, despite
the massive struggles underlying the demand for civil rights reform, ac-
ceptance of that reform and the shape that it has ultimately taken must be
understood in the context I have sketched.
From my perspective, the goal of civil rights law is to offer a credible
measure of tangible progress without in any way disturbing class structure
generally. The more specific version of what would be in the interest of
the ruling classes would be to "bourgeoisify" a sufficient number of mi-
nority people in order to transform those people into active, visible, legiti-
mators of the underlying and basically unchanged social structure. The
question to be asked is whether particular strategies for fighting racism,
such as affirmative action, run the risk of being caught up in the process
of improving the lot of a small number of middle-class minority people,
while consigning vast numbers of lower class minority people, who dispro-
71. See Freeman, supra note 45.
72. Cf T. SKOOPOL, STATES AND SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS 14-33 (1979); Block, The Ruling Class
Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State, SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, May-June 1977,
at 6-28 (now SOCIALIST REVIEW).
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portionately populate lower classes already, to a longer term in their situ-
ation. The question is not whether racism in all of its continuing manifes-
tations is different from class division geneally-surely it is different.
The question is the extent to which anything significant can be done
about the concededly unique problem of racism without paying attention
to class structure and the forces that maintain it.
My answer to the question must be obvious by now. One way of cap-
turing it is to consider the sort of dilemma often posed in "normative"
debate about affirmative action programs. How does one justify to a per-
sonally "innocent" white working-class person his or her displacement in
favor of an equally or less "qualified" minority person? For me, the an-
swer is easy, and the problem it raises intractable. The harsh answer is
that American society (or some dominant portion of it) has committed it-
self (or did) to remedying its historical problem of race, but has made not
even the pretense of such a commitment with respect to class. The disap-
pointed white worker is a class victim; the very notion of "qualification"
presupposes as reality the myth of equality of opportunity. To remedy
racism in a class society with a stagnant or dwindling economy means
necessarily that burdens of displacement will fall heavily on powerless
whites.7"
Then comes the intractable part. If the history cited by Bell and ampli-
fied by Fredrickson suggests anything, the assault on racism under such
circumstances will come to a halt, lest it unleash too much white rage or
expose the reality of class relationships. There is nothing particularly rad-
ical about the goal of ending racial discrimination. The goal would be
achieved if nonwhites were stratified across American society in percent-
ages similar to whites. The class structure would remain intact. The ques-
tion raised by Bell's book is whether even that modest, liberal reformist
goal is at all achievable without a radical confrontation with the truth of
American history and society, past and present.
73. See L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 178-89 (1980).
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